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Articles
D.G.T. Williams* The Spycatcher Saga
I. Introduction
The central facts in the unfolding of the Spycatcher saga are relatively
well-known. Peter Wright left M.I.5 in 1976 after some twenty years'
service "in the shadows;"' his health was "bad", his pension "derisory",
but he had his "memories."'2 After retirement he went to live in Tasmania,
where (according to Kirby P in the Court of Appeal of New South
Wales) "he still resides in a place with the idyllic name of Cygnet."'3
Despite the distance Peter Wright remained closely involved in the welter
of allegations and denials, which emerged especially after the unmasking
of Anthony Blunt as a former double agent in late 1979, about the inner
workings of M.I.5 and Soviet penetration of M.I.5. In 1984 a television
interview with Mr. Wright concerned in part the suggestion that Sir
Roger Hollis, a former Director-General of M.I.5, had been a Soviet
agent. In March 1985 Mr. Wright was approached by a representative of
Heinemann, the publisher, to write a candid account of his life in the
shadows; and the British government, on learning of these plans, sought
injunctions in the courts of New South Wales. The contents of
Spycatcher, as it became, ranged far beyond the allegations concerning
Sir Roger Hollis to encompass allegations about the bugging of
diplomatic premises and of diplomatic conferences, about a plot to
assassinate President Nasser of Egypt, about attempts to destabilise the
Labour government under Mr. Harold Wilson, and about much else.
Many of the allegations had appeared in print before Spycatcher
emerged, but the status of the author, it was claimed by the Crown, gave
them a special ring of authenticity.
*D.G.T. Williams, Rouse Ball Professor of English Law, President Wolfson College, Vice-
Chancellor, Cambridge University
*This article is based on the Horace E. Read Lecture delivered at Dalhousie Law School in Octo-
ber 1988. The lecture was delivered ahead of the second decision of the House of Lords on
Spycatcher and before the introduction of the Security Service Bill and the Official Secrets Bill.
References to these later developments are made briefly in this revised and shortened text. See
Notes in [1985] Cambridge L.J. 2 and 329 and [1989] Cambridge T.J. 1. For a report of all
decisions in Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2), see [1988] 3 All E.R. 545.
I. P. Wright, Spycatcher. The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer.
(Toronto: Stoddard Publishing Co., 1987) at 27.
2. Id, at 38 1.
3. Attorney-Generalfor the United Kingdom v. Heinemann Publishers Australia Pry Ltd and
PeterMaurice Wigh (1987) 10 N.S.W.L.R. 86.
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The civil proceedings launched in New South Wales and later in other
jurisdictions were based on the claim that Peter Wright owed an
obligation of confidence with regard to information acquired in the
Security Service. This obligation was presented or argued with variations
from court to court in Australia and elsewhere. The boundaries of the
obligation of confidence - arising out of commercial and other
relationships - are still being explored. In a case in 1988, for instance,
it was held that information relating to sexual conduct could in some
circumstances be the subject of a legally enforceable duty of confidence.
There was no precedent for protecting such information, but it was said
by Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C that there was nothing either in
principle or authority to stand in the way.4
It is also the case, as one judge has put it, that there "are relatively few
authorities in which the duty of confidence has been discussed in
connection with secrets of government."'5 The first authority in the field
was Attorney General v. Jonathan Cape Ltd in the mid-1970s, 6 where it
was held that an injunction could in principle be granted to stop
publication of Richard Crossman's Diary of his time as a Cabinet
Minister from 1964 to 1970. Lord Widgery C.J. was prepared to extend
the duty of confidence to "public secrets," just as a few years earlier it had
been extended to marital secrets,7 and he was prepared to undertake a
balancing exercise to determine whether an injunction would be in the
public interest. A like approach was later adopted by Mason J. in
Commonwealth of Australia v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd8 In any
balancing exercise, considerations of national security would obviously
weigh heavily in favour of a government's claims, but at the heart of the
arguments submitted in the Spycatcher litigation was the question as to
how far the balance should be tilted.
The British government did not achieve much success in the litigation
in Australia, apart from delaying publication of Spycatcher as a result of
interlocutory proceedings starting in late 1985. At first instance in New
South Wales the case was heard by Powell J., whose lengthy judgment
of March 1987 (holding against the British government) stressed that
4. Stephens v. Avery, [1988] 2 All E.R. 477, 482 Ch. D. In the course of his judgment, the
Vice-Chancellor agreed that the courts would not enforce a duty of confidence "relating to
matters which have a grossly immoral tendency." His Lordship added (at 480) that "at the
present day the difficulty is to identify what sexual conduct is to be treated as grossly immoral."
5. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2), [1988] 2 W L.R. 805, 842.
6. [1976] Q.B. 752. See Williams, "Official Secrecy and the Courts" in Reshaping the
CriminalLaw (ed. Glazebrook, 1978) 154-173; Report of the Committee of Privy Councillors,
MinisterialMemoirs, Cmnd. 6386, January 1986; Hugo Young, The Crossman Affair (1976).
7. Argyll (Duchess) v. Argyll (Duke), [1967] Ch. 302.
8. (1980), 47 C.L.R. 39.
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most of the principal allegations in the book had already appeared in the
United Kingdom and that the British government had acquiesced to some
extent. Appendix A to the judgment, incidentally, lists no less than 33
books on security and intelligence matters which were tendered in
evidence.9 The Court of Appeal of New South Wales rejected the British
government's appeal in a divided decision of September 1987.10 All three
judges adopted very different emphases. Of the majority, it was the
central approach of Kirby P. which later won endorsement in the High
Court of Australia in June 1988.11 Kirby P. took the view, which takes
us into the realm of the Conflict of Laws, that to grant relief would be
inconsistent with the principle that Australian courts do not enforce the
public law and policy of a foreign state. His Honour commented that the
disinclination of the English courts "to enforce revenue, penal, political
and other public laws of foreign sovereigns simply reflects a fundamental
principle of private international law." He apologised for describing
England as a "foreign country" for this purpose, and he had no doubt that
the British government's action was "one, directly or indirectly, for the
enforcement of the public law of secrecy imposed by the statutes,
common law and prerogative in the United Kingdom upon officers and
former officers of the security services of that country, including M.I.5."
In the High Court Mason C.J. examined the relevant law on
unenforceability in some detail, but his recognition that the contours of
the principle are not clear is underlined by the different analysis offered
by Cooke P. in Spycatcher litigation before the Court of Appeal of New
Zealand.12 In a decision of March 1988, Cooke P. argued that the "world
is shrinking, with nuclear hazards, terrorism, ideologies and the power of
the media transcending national boundaries and at times making them
almost irrelevant," adding that it would "seem anachronistic for the
Courts to deny themselves any power to do what they can to safeguard
the security of a friendly foreign state."
The attention given to the principle of enforceability by no means
obscured the arguments based on confidentiality, and several of the
judges both in Australia and New Zealand had the opportunity to
comment at length. In New Zealand, where the proceedings were
brought against The Dominion ( a Wellington newspaper) by the British
government, Cooke P. was at pains to disavow any intention to interpret
9. Attorney-General for the United Kingdom v. Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd
(1987), 8 N.S.WL.R. 341.
10. Supra, note 3.
11. (1988), 78 A.L.R. 449 See generally, Malcolm Turnbull, The Spycatcher Trial (1988).
12. Attorney-General of the United Kingdom v. Wellington Newspapers Ltd, [1988] 1
N.Z.L.R. 129 (Cooke R, McMullin J., Casey J., Bisson J.).
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the public interest of the United Kingdom; but he was satisfied that it was
in the public interest of New Zealand that the information from
Spycatcher should be available to the New Zealand public. This view
was vigorously re-asserted when the British government sought
discretionary leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council from the Court of Appeal in New Zealand. In a ruling in late
April 1988, Cooke P. stressed that the merits of the case could only be
assessed from the point of view of a New Zealand court, bearing in mind
"the development of New Zealand law in what is clearly a somewhat
new field and the application of New Zealand law to the particular
facts." 13
Spycatcher proceedings in England began in June 1986, with the
securing of interim injunctions against the Guardian and the Observer to
stop further publication of allegations claimed to be in the forthcoming
book. Action could not be taken directly against Mr. Wright, because he
was outside the jurisdiction. Instead, the English proceedings involved
newspapers caught up as third parties in the legal web of confidentiality.
The constitutional background to the litigation should be considered as a
necessary preliminary to an examination of how the English courts have
responded.
II. The Constitutional Background
In the first place, the United Kingdom has often been accused of
obsessive secrecy. Twenty years ago the Fulton Committee on the Civil
Service claimed that civil servants and perhaps also Ministers "are apt to
give great and sometimes excessive weight to the difficulties and
problems which would undoubtedly arise from more open processes of
administration and policy-making."' 4 A continuing adherence to secrecy
in the United Kingdom has been bolstered by the notorious section 2 of
the Official Secrets Act 1911 which in theory blankets all official
information. Section 2 survived intermittent controversy between the
wars, and one of the prosecutions brought the novelist Compton
Mackenzie to the dock at the Old Bailey. The charge against him, to
which he pleaded guilty, related to a book called Greek Memories
detailing some aspects of his intelligence work in Greece during the First
13. Attorney-General of the United Kingdom v. Wellington Newspapers Ltd (No. 2), [1988]
N.Z.L.R. 180.
14. Cmnd. 3638, para. 380. In a criminal prosecution in 1978, an army officer giving evidence
was accused of being obsessed with secrecy. He replied (see The 7mes, 19 October 1978, at
2); "1 am not obsessed with secrecy. Because of my knowledge of the subject I am better aware
than many people of the crucial need to ensure that some secrets which are more secret than
others are kept as secret as possible."
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World War. He was fined 1100, the book was expensively withdrawn
from the bookshops and pulped, and - to the best of my knowledge -
the book has never been republished in an unexpurgated version.15 After
the Second World War selective prosecutions continued with
considerable governmental success until 1970; but there then began a
number of prosecutions where the Government stumbled. The anomalies
of section 2 were such that judges and juries reacted critically; a
Departmental Committee under Lords Franks reported in 1972 urging
widespread reform; there were several abortive attempts at legislation and
there were two White Papers, one in 1978 and one in 1988, seeking to
shed light at the end of the tunnel.16 But the tunnel has been long and
tortuous. Bearing in mind that the Official Secrets Act was born easily (it
went through all its stages in the House of Commons in less than thirty
minutes) and that a High Court judge in early 1971 looked forward to
section 2 being "pensioned off' on its sixtieth birthday in August of that
year, only in 1989 were we able to anticipate its final demise -
unintentionally marking the hundredth anniversary of the first Official
Secrets Act of 1889 - through a new Official Secrets Act.
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom has no legislation on freedom of
information akin to that in the United States, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand. Ministers regularly claim advances in openness, but critics of the
recent White Paper on section 2 argued that any acceptable reform of the
law should be accompanied by some statutory provision for access to
information. The British government has rejected any such quid pro quo,
and for the immediate future - despite a vigorous freedom of
information campaign with all-party support - no legislation is likely to
be forthcoming.
A second constitutional factor to be considered in the context of
Spycatcher is the remarkable British adherence, especially as to national
security, to non-statutory institutions, procedures and practices. This in its
turn reflects the absence of a written constitution and particularly of a Bill
of Rights, though at least one distinguished judge (Lord Bridge of
Harwich) has in the course of Spycatcher given an indication of
increasing impatience with rather vague reliance on the common law as
a guarantor of British liberties. His Lordship indicated in a dissenting
speech in mid-1987 that hitherto he had not been in favour of
15. See Williams, Not in the Public Interest (1965), at 90; Compton Mackenzie, My Life and
imes. Octave Seven 1931-1938 (1968). It might be mentioned that no objection was raised
in 1962 to the publication of H. Montgomery Hyde's book on Sir William Stephenson, The
Quiet Canadian (1962), though questions were raised in the House of Commons (see
Williams, supra, note 5 at 90-91).
16. Much of the history of section 2 since 1970 has been extensively chronicled. The latest
White Paper, Cm. 408 of July 1988, met with a mixed and often hostile reception.
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incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into
domestic law, in large part because, as he put it, he had "had confidence
in the capacity of the common law to safeguard the fundamental
freedoms essential to a free society including the right of freedom of
speech which is specifically safeguarded by article 10 of the
convention." 17 His confidence, he added, had been "seriously
undermined" by the decision of the majority in the House of Lords.
Insofar as the common law has any resilience in the protection of
fundamental freedoms, however, it is handicapped by the lack of
definition, particularly of statutory definition, in many aspects of national
security.
There are numerous examples of this lack of definition. Until 1989
neither M.I.5, the Security Service, nor M.I.6, the Secret Service, was
provided for or regulated in any way by statute. A rare public appearance
by M.I.5 agents, which even then was protected by ensuring the
anonymity of the individuals involved, was at the recent coroner's inquest
on the deaths of the three I.R.A. members in Gibraltar.' 8 A consequence
of the absence of statutory provision is that political accountability has
been difficult to establish other than through Ministerial forms of control,
and accountability to a Parliamentary select committee has not been
secured. 19 In the Spycatcher litigation Lord Donaldson M.R. said with
regard to M.I.5 that it "may be that the time has come when Parliament
should regularise the position of the service; '20 and eventually the
Security Service Act 1989 emerged, promising a form of statutory
regulation for M.I.5. M.I.6 remains free of statute, and much of the work
of M.I.5 and M.I.6 remains outside the range of statutory definition. The
Security Commission, for instance, is charged with investigating the
efficiency and proper working of M.I.5 at the request of the Prime
Minister; set up in 1964 the Commission has publicly reported on such
events as the association of two Government Ministers with prostitutes,
the circumstances in which a temporary shorthand typist in the Cabinet
Office was charged with an official secrets offence, the espionage
activities (leading to a 35-year prison term) of an employee at GCHQ in
Cheltenham (Government Communications Headquarters), and a first
ever conviction (in 1984) of an M.I.5 agent (Michael John Bettaney) for
spying.21 There are also the measures designed to ensure physical and
17. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd, [1987] 3 All E.R. at 346.
18. The inquest ended on September 30, 1988.
19. See the commehts of Lord Donaldson M.R. in Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers
Ltd (No. 2), [1988] 2 WL.R. at 877-78, C.A.
20. Id, at 880.
21. See respectively Reports of the Security Commission for July 1973 (Cmnd. 5367), for
June 1967 (Cmnd. 3365), for May 1983 (Cmnd. 8876), and for May 1985 (Cmnd. 9514).
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personnel security in the public service, where - in the words of the
Prime Minister (Mrs. Thatcher) in 1982 - "difficult balances" have "to
be struck between the need to protect national security, the nature and
cost of the measures required to do so effectively, the need for efficiency
and economy in the public service and the individual rights of members
of the public service to personal freedom and privacy. '2 2 These balances,
however, are made in a non-statutory context.
Still in the non-statutory area of security, there is the Special Branch of
each police force - especially the Metropolitan Police Special Branch
which "has responsibilities throughout the kingdom in relation to dealing
with Irish Republican extremism and terrorist groups" - and each
Special Branch acts to assist the security services, often providing the
visible and effective culmination (through arrest or whatever) of security
investigations.23 The Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police
originated through administrative action in 1883, in the face of the Irish-
American dynamite campaign of 1881-85,24 and special branches are
given major responsibilities both in the face of subversion and terrorism
and in the face of threats to public order. A further non-statutory device,
particularly relevant to trials involving issues of national security and
terrorism, is that of jury-vetting, which only came to full-scale public
knowledge in the course of an official secrets prosecution - the so-called
ABC case - in 1978.25 Yet a further device, this time with considerable
implications for freedom of the press, is a system of extra-statutory
censorship called the D-Notice system: in operation in peacetime since
1912 it only came to full-scale public knowledge exactly fifty years later,
it led to at least one major clash between Downing Street and the Press
(the D-Notice affair of 1967), and the Government remains firmly of the
view that the "existence of a voluntary system whose purpose is to seek
protection from publication of information having a bearing on national
security, and which is based on co-operation and consultation between
22. Statement on the Recommendations of the Security Commission, May 1982, Cmnd.
8540, para. 30.
23. See Fourth Report from the Home Affairs Committee, Session 1984-85, Special Branch
H.C. 71 (April 1985), para. 7; Lord Denning's Report, Cmnd. 2152 of September 1963, para.
274.
24. See Bernard Porter, The Historiography of the Early SpecialBranch (1986), 1 Intelligence
and National Security 381; Bernard Porter, The Origins of the Vigilant State The London
Metropolitan Police Special Branch before the First World War (1987). The concept of a
Special Branch (aimed at subversion in particular) is not confined to British experience: see
Report of the Royal Commission (South Australia) on the Dismissal of Harold Hubert
Salisbury (1978).
25. See 0. Hood Phillips and Paul Jackson, 0. Hood Phillips' Constitutional and
Administrative Law (1987), at 384-86. The Special Branch and sometimes the Security Service
are involved in jury-vetting.
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the government and the media, provides a necessary and beneficial
service for both. '26
Legislation, when it does occur, is often patchy and a response to a
particular event or pressure. The Security Service Act is an example, in
part a response to Spycatcher. Access to public records was in a chaotic,
non-statutory state until legislation of 1958; and the changes of 1958 and
afterwards came about both in the interests of departmental efficiency
and through "increased pressure by historians, social scientists,
journalists, and a wider public for access to recent records. ' '27
Nevertheless, the interests of security and intelligence are well protected
within the discretionary powers to extend the presumptive period of
thirty years for access, and it could well be 100 years or more before
many of the relevant records are released.28 In the area of data protection,
where legislation had long been delayed, a Data Protection Act was
eventually enacted in 1984, in no small measure because of our
commercial need to conform with a Council of Europe Data Protection
Convention; but the Convention allows derogation from the general
principles in the interests inter alia of State security. 29 The 1984 Act duly
allows for a wide exemption "for the purpose of safeguarding national
security" as interpreted exclusively by the Crown.30 Yet a further example
of an area that was late in legislative formulation is that of the
interception of communications, where the external stimulus was
provided by an adverse decision of the European Court of Human
Rights.3t The Interception of Communications Act 1985 is a somewhat
grudging piece of legislation, as one might have expected, and in its
White Paper on section 2 of the Official Secrets Act the Government
supported continued and wide protection through the criminal law for
26. The D Notice System. Observations presented by the Secretary of State for Defence (on
H.C. 773 of Session 1979-80), Cmnd. 8129 of January 1981, para. 2. See also Security
Procedures in the Public Service (the Radcliffe Report), Cmnd. 1681 of April 1962, Ch. 9;
Report of the Committee of Privy Councillors appointed to inquire into "D" notice matters,
Cmnd. 3309 of June 1967; The "D" Notice System (White Paper, Cmnd. 3312 of June 1967);
Williams, "Official Secrecy in England" (1968) 3 Federal L.R. 20; Third Report from the
Defence Committee, Session 1979-80, The D Notice System, H.C. 773, August 1980.
27. Modem Public Records. Selection and Access (Report of the Wilson Committee), Cmnd.
8204 of March 1981, para. 47.
28. Id, para. 197-200. See Modern Public Records (The Government response to the Report
of the Wilson Committee), Cmnd. 8531 of March 1982, para. 28. In Secret Service (1985),
however, Christopher Andrew writes in his preface (xvi) that intelligence material was often
carelessly or accidentally released either to the Public Record Office or in private papers.
29. See Data Protection. The Government's Proposals for Legislation, Cmnd. 8539 of April
1982, para. 2-5 and 17.
30. Data Protection Act 1984, s. 27.
31. Malone v. United Kingdom (1984), 7 E.H.R.R. 14. See the decision of Sir Robert Megarry
V-C in Malone v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch. 344.
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information relating to telephone tapping and like procedures.32 On
broad issues of the law relating to breach of confidence - the theme of
the Spycatcher litigation - we still have no legislation despite detailed
consideration and proposals by the Law Commission some years back.33
If legislation is forthcoming, possibly as a result of Spycatcher, there will
probably once again be special national security exemptions, though the
Law Commission spoke of the possibility of statutory definition of the
methods used by both the police and the security services to obtain
information.34
The third constitutional factor to be borne in mind in the Spycatcher
saga is that the role of the courts in matters of national security has never
been easy. National security imposes severe constraints in all countries
and all jurisdictions, of course, but the cumulative impact of so many
non-statutory and extra-statutory institutions and practices in the United
Kingdom is bound to add to the exclusion of the courts. The
governmental view has long favoured keeping the courts at arm's length.
In its response to the Crossman Diaries case a Committee of Privy
Councillors under Lord Radcliffe, in searching for an alternative
mechanism for protecting governmental confidentiality, did not regard a
judge as "likely to be so equipped as to make him the best arbiter of the
issues involved," adding that the relevant considerations are "political
and administrative;" 35 on the matter of adjudicating on statutory access to
information, a Green Paper of 1979 suggested that it was "doubtful
whether in the British context such essentially political matters could be
determined in the Courts; '36 and in the White Paper of 1988 the
government rejected any general defence of the public interest in the
context of a replacement of section 2.37 Similar hesitations are reflected
in Professor Friedland's treatment of the role of the Canadian courts
which he set out in a study of 1979 prepared for the McDonald
Commission.38 Yet the irony of the Spycatcher saga is that the courts in
several jurisdictions have, at the instigation of the British government,
been dramatically involved in matters of national security; and the
involvement has compelled judges to delve into areas of the law beyond
official secrets and confidentiality and to highlight values such as freedom
of speech and freedom of the press.
32. Cm. 408 of June 1988, paras. 30 and 53.
33. Breach of Confidence Law Corn. No. 110, Cmnd. 8388 of October 1981.
34. Id, 6.43.
35. MinisterialMemoirs, Cmnd. 6386 of 1976, paras. 65-66.
36. Open Governmen4 Cmnd. 7520 of 1979, para. 55.
37. Cm. 408, paras. 58-61.
38. National Security: The Legal Dimensions, by M.L. Friedland (1979), Part 5 ("The Role
of the Judiciary").
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Delving into areas beyond official secrets and confidentiality came
about, in particular, because the original Spycatcher litigation in England
was designed to stop two newspapers, the Guardian and the Observer,
from publishing matter alleged to appear in Spycatcher. Injunctions
against them were originally secured on an interlocutory basis in mid-
1986, well ahead of the beginning of the hearing on permanent
injunctions which commenced in November 1987. There was difficulty
enough in framing appropriate interim injunctions, but there was always
the crucial question about how far, if at all, other newspapers were
bound. In April 1987 the matter was tested when the Independent, a
daily newspaper, and two evening newspaper published further material
derived or taken verbatim from Peter Wright's memoirs. Had these
newcomers breached the injunctions, assuming that one could have free-
range injunctions, or was there some other remedy at hand? The
Attorney-General turned with relief to the notoriously expansible area of
criminal contempt of court, and proceedings were undertaken in the
Chancery Division before Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C on the
preliminary issue of law as to whether the actions of the newspapers
could be a contempt.
One should pause at this point to note that criminal contempt
proceedings are nowadays normally brought under the "strict liability"
provisions of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 - another statute,
incidentally, which went on the statute book as a response to an adverse
decision of the European Court of Human Rights. The strict liability
provisions were not relevant in the Independent case, however, because
the Spycatcher proceedings were not "active" within the terms of the
1981 Act. Reliance had to be placed on common law contempt,
expressly preserved by section 6 (c) of the Act, covering intention to
impede or prejudice the administration ofjustice. Could it be said, subject
to trial on such issues as the defendants' intention, that the three
newspapers aimed to endanger trial of the Spycatcher proceedings against
the Guardian and the Observer? The Vice-Chancellor thought not. He
was acutely aware of the national security implications of the decision,
but - after an exhaustive analysis of the authorities including allegedly
"confused" Canadian case-law - he saw objections based on practical
considerations and on natural justice to extending the law of contempt as
the Attorney-General wished. Within weeks an appeal was taken to the
Court of Appeal which overruled the Vice-Chancellor. 39 Lord Donaldson
M.R., in the principal judgment, laid emphasis on the special nature -
irrespective of national security - of confidential information: its
39. Attorney-General v. Newspaper Publishing plc, [1987] 3 All E.R. 276, Ch. D. and C.A.
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"inherently perishable nature" gives rise to "unique problems, '40 whether
or not national security is involved. Again there was a detailed
examination of the law, again the guidance offered by the Canadian
authorities was seen as "limited and confused," there were some
reassuring comments on the nature of the intent to be proved (specific
rather than general intent, thus excluding recklessness), and it was held
that the conduct of the three newspapers could constitute contempt.
The contempt of court proceedings against the Independent and the
other two newspapers, together with proceedings later undertaken against
the Sunday Times on similar grounds, were only resumed in 1989 -
after the civil litigation on Spycatcher had been concluded. Meanwhile
the spin-off from the Court of Appeal's decision is such that the
expansiveness of common law contempt has been further underlined in
a decision of 1988, Attorney-General v. News Group Newspapers Ltd41
The Sun newspaper had in effect campaigned against a medical doctor,
accusing him of rape and other indecencies affecting an eight-year old
girl, and eventually financed a private prosecution which resulted in the
acquittal of the doctor. Going beyond the previously-accepted
preliminary time limits of criminal contempt either at common law or
under statute, the Divisional Court rejected - in the words of Watkins
L.J. - the view "that common law contempt cannot be committed
where proceedings cannot be said to be imminent, but where there is a
specific intent to interfere with the course of justice accompanied by a
real risk that the published matter will impede a fair trial, the occurrence
of which is in contemplation. '42 Reference was made to the Independent
case, prefaced by the claim that the common law "is not a worn-out
jurisprudence rendered incapable of further development by the ever
increasing incursion of parliamentary legislation. '43 Watkius L.J. also
said that the "need for a free press is axiomatic, but the press cannot be
allowed to charge about like a wild unbridled horse. It has, to a necessary
degree, in the public interest, to be curbed."44
The press, it seems, rather than public policy, is now the unruly horse;
and the Spycatcher litigation has demanded of the courts a new and
difficult approach to problems of freedom of speech when balanced, in
particular, against national security. The Independent case is one
illustration of this. Still at the interlocutory stage of the English
proceedings, an even more complex question arose over whether or not
40. Id, at 291.
41. [1988] 2 All E.R. 906, Q.B.B.
42. Id, at 920.
43. Id Watkins LJ. added that the common law "is a lively body of law capable of adaptation
and expansion to meet fresh needs calling for the exertion of the discipline of law."
44. Id, at 921.
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the interim injunctions in force against the Guardian and the Observer
should remain in force after publication of the book Spycatcher in the
United States on 14 July 1987. The Sunday Times, incidentally,
published verbatim extracts from Spycatcher on Sunday 12 July, and
that was what led to the later proceedings for criminal contempt. Also
incidentally but of some importance to an understanding of what
happened after mid-July 1987, neither the postal nor the customs
authorities in the United Kingdom made any effort from the outset to
intercept copies of Spycatcher pouring into the country. To add to the
confusion, however, most bookshops did not offer the book for sale, and
libraries (including university libraries) were inclined towards timidity
after a decision of Knox J. on the Chancery Division in October 1987.45
It was held in that case that for a public library to acquire and make
available copies of Spycatcher, pending trial of the action for permanent
injunctions against the Guardian and the Observer, would be a contempt
or an interference with the due administration of justice; but libraries
were relieved of any need to check on its newspapers, periodicals and
magazines to ensure that they contained no offending material. In making
this ruling, only a few weeks before the action, Knox J. was influenced
not only by the Independent case on contempt, but by the sharply divided
decision of the House. of Lords on maintaining the interim injunctions
pending trial.46
After publication of the book in the United States, the Guardian and
the Observer lost no time in seeking to free themselves of the interim
injunctions. Their central contention was that the floodgates had now
opened and that the Crown no longer had an arguable case for
injunctions at the trial. Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C, who heard
the application at first instance, did not see the issue as simple as that.
Nevertheless he was impressed by the vagueness of the law of
confidentiality and the incongruities of seeking to apply it on the facts of
Spycatcher; and, while conceding the importance of the secrecy of the
security services, he was not prepared to shut his eyes to the realities.
Indeed, his Lordship saw "the freedom of the press" as a "matter of very
great public importance in its own right. '47 He concluded, in discharging
the interim injunctions, with references to Canute and the tide, to the little
Dutch boy and the dyke, and to the danger of the law appearing to be
"an ass."48 Two days later, and for the second time in a week, the Vice-
45. Attorney-General v. Observer Ltd Re an Application by Derbyshire County Counci4
[1988] 1 All E.R. 385, Ch. D. See also, Times Higher Education Supplemen 13 November
1987.
46. Attorney-General v.Guardian Newspapers Ltd, [1987] 3 All E.R. 316, Ch. D. C.A., H.L.
47. Id, at 331.
48. Id, 332.
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Chancellor was overruled by the Court of Appeal, and shortly afterwards
the House of Lords by 3 to 2 affirmed the Court of Appeal. The interim
injunctions remained in force.
What different view of the realities could have influenced the Court of
Appeal and the majority in the House of Lords? In essence they saw a
danger of prejudicing the Attorney-General's case by discharging the
injunctions and they saw the interests of national security as prevailing
over those of freedom of the press. On the issue of freedom of the press,
Lord Templeman (one of the majority in the House of Lords) referred to
article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights - which
protects freedom of expression - and enumerated reasons why it was
"necessary in a democratic society" to derogate from that protection, as
the article permits, "in the interests of national security. ' 49 These reasons
are the harassment of the Security Service which would follow from
"mass circulation" of the Spycatcher allegations, the need to avoid "an
immutable precedent," and the danger of giving in to pressure from the
media; and his Lordship insisted that the "imposition of restraints on the
press in the exercise of a judicial discretion in conformity with the
convention is an expression and not a negation of democracy in action."50
Lord Ackner, another of the majority, spoke in scathing terms of the
"press hysteria" which greeted the announcement of the House of Lords'
decision two weeks ahead of the reasons, adding later in his speech "that
there are elements in the press as a whole which lack not only
responsibility but integrity."'51 At one point his Lordship noted that in the
United States "the courts, by virtue of the First Amendment, are, I
understand, powerless to control the press. Fortunately, the press in this
country is, as yet, not above the law...-52
The last remark highlights the absence of any constitutional guarantee
of free speech in the United Kingdom, apart from the external influence
of the European Convention. Yet some of the underlying themes of the
First Amendment, not least the presumption against prior restraint, are
part and parcel of the common law. In the Supreme Court case of Near
v. MinnesotaS3 in 1931, Hughes C.J. cited with approval Blackstone's
claim in the Commentaries that the liberty of the press "consists in laying
no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from
49. Id, 355-57.
50. Id, 357.
51. Id, 362 and 365 respectively.
52. Id, 363.
53. (1931), 283 U.S. 697, at 713-20. See Fred. W. Friendly, Minnesota Rag. The Dramatic
Story of the Landmark Supreme Court Case that gave New Meaning to Freedom of the Press
(1981). (Vintage Books edition, 1982).
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censure for criminal matter when published," and in a case on
commercial confidentiality in 1981 Lord Denning M.R. (dissenting)
referred both to Blackstone's doctrine of "prior restraint" and to the
"classic case" of Near v. Minnesota54 The two dissenting members of the
House of Lords in Spycatcher in the summer of 1987 were also swayed
by the importance of a free press, and some of their comments were
among the sharpest expressed in the House of Lords in recent years.
These comments virtually determined the terms of reference for the later
trial on permanent injunctions.
Neither of the dissenters, Lord Bridge of Harwich and Lord Oliver of
Aylmerton, was thrown off balance by distaste for Peter Wright or by
sensing indignation that he might have "got away with it."'55 Lord Oliver,
for instance, said that liberty "may be and sometimes is harnessed to the
carriage of liars or charlatans, but that cannot be avoided if the liberty is
to be preserved,"56 and it might be recalled in this regard that Jay M.
Near of Near v. Minnesota was a man whose sentiments were "anti-
Catholic, anti-Semitic, antiblack and anti-labor. '57 Frankfurter J. once
said in the Supreme Court of the United States that it "is a fair summary
of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged
in controversies involving not very nice people. '58 In Spycatcher both
Lord Bridge and Lord Oliver were more concerned to stress the
absurdities of the situation and the importance of a free press. Lord
Bridge, for instance, noting that freedom of speech is always "the first
casualty under a totalitarian Regime," said that the "present attempt to
insulate the public in this country from information which is freely
available elsewhere is a significant step down" a "very dangerous road." 59
Lord Oliver, conscious of our reputation as "the cradle of democratic
liberty,"60 spoke of the realities of the situation and described (citing
Blackstone) the liberty of the press as "essential to the nature of a free
state. '61 " 'Facilis est descensus Averno,' " his Lordship added with
reference to Virgil's Aeneid, "and to attempt, even temporarily, to create
a sort of judicial cordon sanitaire against the infection from abroad of
public comment and discussion is not only, as I believe, certain to be
ineffective but involves taking the first steps on a very perilous path."62
54. Schering Chemicals Ltd v.Falkman Ltd [1982] Q.B. 1, 17, [1981] All E.R. 321,330.
55. Supra, note 45, at 345.
56. Id, at 376.
57. Minnesota Rag supra, note 53, at 32.
58. UnitedStates v.Rabinowitz(1950), 339 U.S. 56,69.
59. Supra, note 45, at 346-47.
60. Id, at 371.
61. Id, at 376.
62. Id at 376.
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The background of allegedly obsessive secrecy, the absence of
statutory definition in matters of national security, and the difficult role
of the courts in seeking to balance national security against freedom of
the press, remind one of the complicated platform on which the
Spycatcher saga was staged.
III. PrincipalLitigation
The principal action began on 23 November 1987. Had the proceedings
been directly against Peter Wright or any agent of his, most of the judges
agreed that on the facts a permanent injunction could have been secured.
Such unanimity was lacking on most other issues except for the holding,
with varying emphases, that there could be no "Spycatcher 2" injunction
to protect against further disclosures by Mr. Wright or other agents and
ex-agents.
A division of views occurred on the following matters. First, were the
Guardian and the Observer in breach of the duty of confidentiality when
they first published the allegations in 1986? Scott J., the Court of Appeal,
Lord (Donaldson M.R. dissenting) and the House of Lords (Lord
Griffiths dissenting) held that they were not. Scott J. noted that the
newspapers became subject to a duty of confidence as third parties and
that public interest factors "may apply to the information in the hands of
the original confidant."63 This was, he added, particularly the case with
newspapers, and he was prepared to seek a balancing process consistent
with our treaty obligations under article 10 of the European Convention.
His Lordship went on to speak of the legitimate interest of the British
public in June 1986 in the forthcoming proceedings in New South
Wales, of the fact that many of the allegations had already been
ventilated in earlier books or broadcasts, and of the possible defence of
iniquity or wrongdoing. On the latter point he said that "the ability of the
press freely to report allegations of scandals in government is one of the
bulwarks of our democratic govemment;"'' but in the Court of Appeal
Dillon L.J. entered a caveat to the effect that allegations of iniquity
should be "credible" and published only after weighing other aspects of
the public interest.65 Lord Donaldson M.R., albeit in dissent, amplified
this point by suggesting that, given the strong presumption in favour of
secrecy, the newspapers should run all sorts of checks before publication.
"We really cannot afford," he declared, "to lose an immensely valuable
national baby in an indiscriminate outpouring of allegedly dirty
63. [1988] 2 W.L.R. at 848.
64. Id, at 858.
65. Id, at 897.
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bathwater.'' 66 The iniquity defence alone might not have saved the
Guardian and the Observer; it was the cumulative impact of all the
relevant considerations behind the decision to publish that saved the day.
Secondly, was the Sunday Times in breach of its duty by publishing
verbatim extracts from Spycatcher in mid-July 1987 just ahead of
publication of the book in the United States? Scott J., the Court of
Appeal (Bingham L.J. dissenting) and the House of Lords held that it was
and that the Attorney-General would be entitled to an account of profits
on the basis that there was "sufficient inferential evidence ... of
increased circulation attributable to the Spycatcher extract." 67 The
publication of the extracts had not, it seems, been subject to adequate
critical assessment in terms of the public interest. Nevertheless, Bingham
L.J. returned to the realities of the situation on 12 July. It was a "virtual
certainty" that widespread publication of the book would take place in
the United States "imminently," and he would have allowed in effect a
projected defence of worldwide dissemination.68
Thirdly and finally, should permanent injunctions be granted against
all three newspapers? It was unanimously agreed that the Guardian and
the Observer should be relieved of further restraint despite the argument
that injunctions were necessary for the morale of M.I.5 and to reassure
the security services of friendly nations. Emphasis was placed on the
futility of injunctions in the face of world-wide dissemination and on the
importance of freedom of the press; and the effect of lifting the
injunctions would be "that no injunction should be granted to restrain
any public library in this country from stocking copies of Spycatcher and
lending them out, or to restrain booksellers in this country from selling
copies of Spycatcher bought from abroad."69 Scott J., a majority of the
Court of Appeal and a majority (4-1) of the House of Lords also refused
a permanent injunction against renewed publication by the Sunday
Times of verbatim extracts from Spycatcher. Lord Donaldson M.R.
dissented on the ground that the Sunday Times, in the process of
serialisation, stood in the shoes of Mr. Wright "by virtue of a contract
with and licence granted by his publishers. '70 Bingham L.J., one of the
majority, accepted that there was an anomaly in allowing serialisation,
but it would also be anomalous, he said, if a citizen of England "could
read reports and reviews of the book and comments on it in the
newspapers, and could buy it in a bookshop or borrow it from a public
66. Id, at 879.
67. Id, at 859.
68. Id, at 919.
69. Id, at 894.
70. Id, at 887.
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library, but could not read a serialised extract of the book in a
newspaper." 7' In other words, the balance of anomalies favoured the
Sunday Times.
The British Government may well argue that the lengthy proceedings
were worthwhile, on the principle of pour encourager Ies autres, and
section 2 of the Official Secrets Act has been replaced with the lessons of
Spycatcher very much in mind. Perhaps, at a later stage, the law of
confidence will be put on a statutory basis with Spycatcher very much in
mind. On the other hand the present or some future Government may
find irresistible the pressure for more and more statutory definition in
areas of national security; and the press, at a time when the media are
under a variety of pressures, may ultimately gain from a strong
affirmation of the spirit of article 10 of the European Convention. Cases
such as Spycatcher will make us turn to the experience of the United
States under the Bill of Rights and to Canadian experience under the
Charter. There are also lessons to be derived from Spycatcher of
relevance to the United States and Canada, for many of the balancing
exercises undertaken in the proceedings on matters of national security
are unavoidable in any democratic country. With some reluctance, a
Conference on Privy Councillors recognised in 1956 that in some of the
measures which the State is driven to take to protect its security "it is
right to continue the practice of tilting the balance in favour of offering
greater protection to the security of the State rather than in the direction
of safeguarding the rights of the individual." 72 The perennial question,
however, is when does one tilt the balance and how far does one tilt the
balance. That is the essence of the Spycatcher saga.
71. Id, at 914.
72. Satement on the Findings of the Conference of Privy Councillors on Security, Cmd. 9715
of March 1956, para. 15.
